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"DO YOU WANT TO DANCE" AROUND THE LAW?
LEARN THE LATEST STEPS FROM THE NINTH
CIRCUIT IN MIDLER V. FORD MOTOR COMPANY
I. INTRODUCTION
The common-law right of publicity doctrine has traditionally been
invoked to protect an individual's pecuniary interest in his or her name
or likeness.I The doctrine basically recognizes the commercial value of a
public figure's identity and grants that person a monopoly in his or her
own persona.2 However, the scope of protection afforded by the right of
publicity doctrine is unclear. Until recently, courts limited the applica-
tion of the doctrine to protect only a person's name,3 nickname,4 visual
likeness,5 performance,6 originally created character,' or distinctive voice
not fixed in a particular copyrighted song.8 The courts had previously
rejected the idea of extending the right of publicity to prevent one from
imitating an artist's voice when singing a licensed song, since the imitator
obtained permission from the copyright holder to use the song in any
way.9 As a result of this treatment by the courts, the adage "imitation
alone does not give rise to a cause of action"10 held firm-until the 1988
case of Midler v. Ford Motor Co.' 1
In Midler, the Ninth Circuit extended the common-law right of pub-
licity to prevent the commercial exploitation of performer Bette Midler's
1. J. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 4.9, at 4-49 (1989). See
also Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
2. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
3. Id.; see also Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970); Wyatt
Earp Enters., Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
4. See, e.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 397, 280 N.W.2d 129,
137 (1979).
5. See, eg., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir.
1974); All, 447 F. Supp. at 729; Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 285
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
6. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
7. See, eg., Price v. Worldvision Enters., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252, 257-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979).
8. See Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962).
9. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 718 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145, 1147
(C.D. Cal. 1969).
10. For cases using this language, see Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 713; Davis, 297 F. Supp. at
1147; Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
11. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
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voice, even though the defendants had obtained a license from the copy-
right holder to use the song she sang.12 Although the court ultimately
recognized that the public is able to identify a performer by the sound of
his or her voice, 3 it chose a peculiar route to grant Ms. Midler protec-
tion. The court struggled to distinguish precedent, employing hollow
reasoning to stretch the right of publicity doctrine to protect The Divine
Miss M's14 rendition of the song, "Do You Want To Dance."'"
This Note analyzes the Midler decision in light of contrary prece-
dent. It further suggests an alternative analysis which would have al-
lowed the Ninth Circuit to arrive at the same conclusion by applying
existing statutory law.16 Next, this Note explores the potential conflict
between the new law created by the Ninth Circuit and the Copyright Act
of 1976. This conflict, briefly stated in the context of Midler, is that even
if Midler is protected by California state law, federal copyright law may
preempt her claim.17 Finally, this Note proposes a possible reconcilia-
tion between the state law which protects the performer, and the federal
law which protects the licensed owner of the copyright."
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: MIDLER v FORD MOTOR CO.
In 1985, Ford Motor Company, along with its advertising agency,
Young & Rubicam, began a campaign to advertise Ford's new Mercury
Sable. 9 They commenced "The Yuppie2 Campaign," which was
designed to lure young, affluent consumers into Ford dealerships by con-
necting the image of the -car to the target consumer's fond memories of
college in the 1970s.2 To generate this connection, Ford, through
Young & Rubicam, decided to have vocal stars sing popular hit songs of
the 1970s in Ford's television commercials.
22
Young & Rubicam approached Bette Midler's agent, inquiring
12. Id. at 462.
13. Id. at 463.
14. Id. at 461. "The Divine Miss M" is the name of Bette Midler's 1973 album featuring
the song "Do You Want To Dance." Id.
15. Id. at 462.
16. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1984). See infra notes 109-216 and accompanying
text for a discussion of California Civil Code section 3344.
17. See infra notes 310-403 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal preemption.
18. See infra notes 404-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proposed
resolution.
19. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988).
20. The term "Yuppie" is an acronym which stands for a "young upwardly mobile profes-
sional." J. GREEN, THE DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY SLANG 315 (1984).
21. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
22. Id.
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whether Midler would participate in the campaign by singing "Do You
Want To Dance," a selection from her 1973 album, "The Divine Miss
M."12 3 After receiving a flat rejection from Midler's agent,24 Young &
Rubicam decided to use a "sound-alike"25 to imitate Midler's voice.26
They contacted Ula Hedwig, a backup singer for Midler for ten years.27
The agency asked Hedwig to make a tape of "Do You Want To Dance,"
and to sound as much like Midler as possible.28 After Young & Rubicam
heard the tape, Hedwig was hired and produced a final recording for the
commercial.29
After the commercial aired publicly, Midler was told by many peo-
ple that it sounded exactly like her rendition of "Do You Want To
Dance."' 30 Also, many people praised Hedwig for her ability to imitate
Midler's voice. 31 Subsequently, Midler sued Ford and Young & Rubi-
cam, stating a cause of action in tort, based on the unauthorized use of a
Midler sound-alike in a commercial.32
The trial court was initially sympathetic to Midler, equating the be-
havior of both Ford and Young & Rubicam to that of the "average
thief."13 3 However, the court held that since Young & Rubicam had ob-
tained permission from the copyright holder to use the song, there was
no legal principle preventing them from imitating Midler's voice.34 The
trial court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ants.3" Midler then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
23. Id. Young & Rubicam had a license from the copyright holder to use the song "Do
You Want To Dance." Id. at 462.
24. The conversation between Craig Hazen from Young & Rubicam and Jerry Edelstein,
.Midler's agent, went as follows:
Hazen: Hello, I am Craig Hazen from Young & Rubicam. I am calling you to find
out if Bette Midler would be interested in doing... ?
Edelstein: Is it a commercial?
Hazen: Yes.
Edelstein: We are not interested.
Id. at 461. *
25. The term "sound-alike" refers to one who imitates an artist's voice and manner of
expression for compensation. Telephone interview with Justin Pierce, Vice President of Spe-
cial Projects for New World Entertainment (Sept. 6, 1989).
26. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 461-62.
31. Id. at 462.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
January 1990]
LOYOIL OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the Ninth Circuit. 6
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
Before examining Midler's causes of action, the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed Ford's three arguments for dismissal of Midler's claim: (1) that
the first amendment" protects the rights of the media to reproduce
sound;3 1 (2) that the federal Copyright Act 39 preempts Midler's claim; 40
and (3) that the rule of Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.a" prevents
Midler's recovery. 2
Starting with Ford's first amendment argument, the court noted
that the freedoms of speech and of the press are of primary importance in
our society.4 3 Consequently, the court reasoned, the first amendment
protects a substantial amount of the media's reproduction of likenesses
and sound.' However, the court held, the extent of the media's freedom
depends upon its purpose in using someone's identity.45 The court an-
nounced that if the media's use of a person's identity serves no "informa-
tive or cultural" purpose "but merely exploits the individual portrayed,
immunity will not be granted."" The court implied that the defendants
had imitated Midler's voice for an advertisement serving no "informative
or cultural" purpose.4 7 Therefore, imitation of Midler's voice was not
protected by the first amendment.4 8
The court then discussed preemption by federal copyright law, spe-
cifically section 114(b) of the Copyright Act.49 The Notes of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary for section 114(b) provide that "[m]ere imitation
36. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
39. Copyright Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 101-810, 90 Stat. 2541-
2602 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
40. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
41. 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). See infra notes 284-
309 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sinatra.
42. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
43. Id. (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by
the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1596 (1979)).
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982). Section 114(b) provides in relevant part: "[tihe exclusive
rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording.., do not extend to the making or
duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound
recording." Id.
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of a recorded performance [does] not constitute a copyright infringement
even where one performer deliberately sets out to simulate another's per-
formance as exactly as possible."' Pursuant to its language, section
114(b) would appear to authorize the defendants' imitation of Midler's
rendition of the song.51 However, the court stated that Midler's claim
was not for the use of the song, but for the imitation of her voice.52
Therefore, the court held that Midler's claim was not a copyright claim
and was not preempted by federal copyright law.53
Finally, the court turned to the Sinatra case in which the Ninth
Circuit denied Nancy Sinatra relief54 on facts very similar to Midler v.
Ford Motor Co." In that case, Sinatra sued Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company for its advertising campaign devised by Young & Rubicam,
using a sound-alike performer to imitate Sinatra's song, "These Boots
Are Made For Walkin'."56 Sinatra based her claim against the defendant
on the theory that the song had acquired a secondary meaning. 7 The
term "secondary meaning" refers to an association formed in the mind of
the consumer which links an individual product (song) with its producer
(singer). 8 Sinatra argued that since the song had acquired a secondary
meaning, the public associated the song with her.59 As a result, she
claimed that the defendant's use of the song constituted unfair competi-
tion.6 0 The Sinatra court rejected her claim and held that since the de-
fendant had obtained a license to use the song from the copyright owner,
50. 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(b) notes of committee on the judiciary (West 1977).
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982).
52. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
53. Id. The court stated that Midler's claim was not a copyright claim because "[a] voice
is not copyrightable." Id.
54. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 718.
55. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
56. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712.
57. Id.
58. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1212-13 (5th ed. 1979).
59. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712.
60. Id. at 714. The term "unfair competition" applies generally to any dishonest or fraud-
ulent rivalry in trade and commerce. See generally Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S.
169, 187 (1896). The term is particularly applied to the practice of endeavoring to substitute
one's own goods or products in the market for those of another who has an established reputa-
tion and extensive sales, by means of imitating or counterfeiting the name, title, size, shape, or
distinctive peculiarities of the article, or other such simulations, with the imitation being car-
ried far enough to mislead the general public. Id. The test of "unfair competition" is not
whether a distinction between two competing products can be recognized when placed along-
side each other, but whether a purchaser of ordinary prudence would be induced by reason of
the marked resemblance in general to mistake one for the other despite differences in matters
of detail. Ralston Purina Co. v. Checker Food Prods. Co., 80 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Mo. Ct. App.
1935).
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federal copyright law preempted Sinatra's claim.6'
The defendants in Midler contended that Midler's claim should
have been rejected on the same grounds as in Sinatra.62 However, the
Midler court distinguished Sinatra's claim, holding that the Sinatra deci-
sion was based upon Sinatra's claim of a secondary meaning to the song,
"These Boots Are Made For Walkin'" which Midler did not claim for
the song, "Do You Want to Dance."63 The court explained that section
102(a) of the Copyright Act' only protects "'original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.' "65 Unlike Sinatra,
Midler was not trying to protect the "fixed" song, but rather her voice,
which is not fixed in any tangible medium of expression.66 Consequently,
the court reasoned that her cause of action was not preempted by section
102(a). 67
After determining that Midler's claim was not preempted by the
Copyright Act, the court discussed Midler's potential rights under state
law.68 First, the court examined California Civil Code section 334469
and then its companion statute, section 990.70
Section 3344 provides for an award of damages when any person
"knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph or like-
ness, in any manner."' 71 The Midler court held that the statute did not
afford Midler any protection for two reasons. First, the court construed
the terms in the statute to protect only the artist's attributes and not
those of an imitator.72 Thus, because the voice used was Ula Hedwig's
and not Midler's, Midler could not claim protection under the statute.73
Second, the court interpreted the term "likeness" narrowly, encompass-
ing solely "visual image[s]," not "vocal imitations.
'7 4
Although the court rejected Midler's section 3344 argument, 75 it af-
forded her protection through a combination of California Civil Code
61. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 717-18.
62. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
63. Id.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
65. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)).
66. Id.
67. Id. See infra notes 352-403 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Copyright
Act.
68. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1984).
70. Id. § 990.
71. Id. § 3344.
72. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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section 990,76 and the common-law action for misappropriation of prop-
erty rights." Section 990 recognizes a "property right" in a deceased
person's voice.78 In order to protect Midler under the common law, the
court referred to section 990's creation of a property right in one's
voice. 79 The court reasoned that "[b]y analogy the common-law rights
are also property rights."8 Therefore, the court implied that a living
person's distinctive voice is a common-law property right.81 Under this
theory, the court stated, if any common-law property rights are illegally
procured, the taker is deemed to have committed the tort of mis-
appropriation. 82
In support of its finding of misappropriation, the court relied on its
decision in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.83 In Mot-
schenbacher, a famous race car driver sued a cigarette manufacturer for
using a photograph of his distinctive racing car in a commercial endorse-
ment for cigarettes.8" Although the plaintiff was pictured in the car, his
features were somewhat blurred." The court held that by using the pic-
ture, the defendant misappropriated the plaintiff's proprietary interest in
his identity.86
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1984). Section 990 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes
of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or
services, without prior consent from the person or persons... shall be liable for any
damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof....
(b) The rights recognized under this section are property rights, freely transferable, in
whole or in part, by contract or by means of trust or testamentary documents,
whether the transfer occurs before the death of the deceased personality, by the de-
ceased personality or his or her transferees, or, after the death of the deceased per-
sonality, by the person or persons in whom such rights vest under this section or the
transferees of that person or persons.
Id. (emphasis added).
77. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(b) (West 1984). Section 990 does not protect a living person's
voice. Similarly, the common-law tort of misappropriation has not recognized a living per-
son's property right in his or her voice. See infra notes 222-83 and accompanying text for a
discussion of misappropriation of property rights.
79. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
84. Id. at 822. The photograph of the car was slightly altered in that a "spoiler" was
attached to the rear of the car and the number on the side of the car was changed. Id. How-
ever, many original features were retained, including the red color, the white pinstriping, and
an oval medallion. Id.
85. Id. Many consumers who saw the advertisement believed that the plaintiff had en-
dorsed the product. Id.
86. Id. at 825.
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While the Midler court acknowledged that Midler's voice was not
used in the commercial, the court extended the rule of Motschenbacher to
protect Midler by finding that the advertisement created the impression
that Midler was actually singing.87 In Motschenbacher, the public's in-
ability to personally identify the plaintiff in the ad was immaterial, since
his racing car, which was closely linked to him, was recognizable. 8 Sim-
ilarly, the court in Midler reasoned that even though Midler's voice
was not used in Ford's advertisement, the imitation of her voice caused
the public to believe that she was actually endorsing the product.89 In
both cases, the defendants appropriated an attribute of the plaintiff's
identity.90
The Midler court further supported its conclusion that Ford and
Young & Rubicam committed the common-law tort of misappropriation
by examining the defendants' common motive in imitating the song.9'
The court pointed out that the defendants would not have solicited Mid-
ler's services had her voice not been valuable to them.92 Moreover, the
court believed the defendants would not have gone to the great lengths of
hiring an imitator if they did not wish to appropriate "an attribute of
Midler's identity." 93
Thus, by sustaining Midler's claim under the common-law tort of
misappropriation, the Ninth Circuit recognized a property right in a
singer's voice.94 However, the court limited its holding to situations in
which the "distinctive voice of a professional singer [who] is widely
known . . . is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product." 95 The
court reversed the summary judgment against Midler by the lower court
and remanded the case for a new trial.9 6
IV. ANALYSIS
The right of publicity is commonly used to encompass several early
common-law actions such as misappropriation 97 and unfair competi-
87. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
88. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 827.
89. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 463-64. See infra Postscript, p. 644 for the results of the new trial.
97. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.6[A], at 5-48.1 to -49.
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tion. 98 In fact, commentators often use these terms interchangeably.99
Sometimes the right of publicity is "expressly invoked" without the court
ever mentioning it by name. '00 One commentator even referred to Mid-
ler v. Ford Motor Co.1°' as a right of publicity case without the Ninth
Circuit using that term.'02
The Midler court examined Midler's interest in her voice by investi-
gating two possible causes of action: (1) whether California Civil Code
section 3344103 could be interpreted to protect Midler;"'° and (2) whether
the common-law right of publicity, specifically the misappropriation doc-
trine,10 5 prevented the defendants from imitating Midler's voice for com-
mercial advantage.106 This section analyzes the court's discussion of
both points and finds it markedly flawed. This section also examines the
Midler decision in light of its contrary precedent, Sinatra v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co.'0 7 Finally, this section addresses the possible preemp-
tion of Midler's cause of action by section 114(b) of the Copyright Act of
1976,108 which the court failed to consider.
A. California Civil Code Section 3344
In California, the right of publicity has been codified in Civil Code
section 3344109 regarding living persons' rights, and in section 99011 re-
garding post-mortem rights." 1 This codification was not meant to dis-
place the common-law right of publicity." 2 Therefore, a plaintiff may
seek rights under the statute, the common law or both.
California Civil Code section 334411 prohibits any person from
98. Id. § 4.14[C], at 4-87.
99. See id. § 5.6[A], at 5-48.1 to -49; Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203, 219-20 (1954).
100. Nimmer, supra note 99, at 219.
101. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
102. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.4[D], at 6-25. The court actually protected Mid-
ler under a misappropriation theory frequently labelled as the right of publicity. Id. § 5.6[A],
at 5-48.1 to -49.
103. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1984).
104. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
105. See infra notes 222-83 for a discussion of the misappropriation doctrine.
106. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
107. 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982).
109. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West 1984).
110. Id. § 990.
111. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.4[E][1], at 6-26 to -26.1.
112. Id. § 6.4[FI[8], at 6-39 to -40. California Civil Code sections 3344(g) and 990(m)
maintain that "[t]he remedies provided for in th[ese] section[s] are cumulative and shall be in
addition to any others provided for by law." CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3344(g), 990(m) (West 1984).
113. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1984). Section 3344 provides in pertinent part:
January 1990]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:601
knowingly using another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or like-
ness, in any manner without first obtaining the person's consent.'1 14 Mid-
ler v. Ford Motor Co. I 5 is a case of first impression with regard to section
3344 as it applies to imitators. Unfortunately, the Midler court dismissed
application of section 3344 because of its unnecessarily narrow interpre-
tation of the terms "voice" and "likeness."
' 1 6
1. Interpretation of "voice"
The California Legislature amended section 3344 in 1984 by adding
the words "voice" and "signature" to subsection (a) of the original 1972
statute.117 The plain language of the statute does not distinguish between
the artist's actual voice and an imitator's voice.' 18 Therefore, the legisla-
ture's broadening of the statute, without qualifying the term voice, indi-
cates a legislative intent to encompass all unauthorized uses of a voice. 119
Instead of interpreting this language broadly to embody all uses of a
voice, the Midler court essentially imputed the word "actual" before the
term "voice." Thus, the court interpreted the term to include only the
unauthorized commercial use of the artist's actual voice, thereby exclud-
ing that of an imitating voice.120
a. statutory construction
Interpreting the term "voice" to encompass all unauthorized uses of
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or
services, without such person's prior consent... shall be liable for any damages sus-
tained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.
Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
116. Id. at 463.
117. Act effective Jan. 1, 1985, ch. 1704, § 2, 1984 Cal. Stat. 6172 (codified as amended at
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West 1984)). The text of the 1972 statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, photograph, or likeness, in any
manner, for purposes of advertising products, merchandise, goods or services, or for
purposes of solicitation of purchases of products, merchandise, goods or services,
without such person's prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior consent of
his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person
or persons injured as a result thereof. In addition, in any action brought under this
section, the person who violated the section shall be liable to the injured party or
parties in an amount no less than three hundred dollars ($300).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (amended 1984).
118. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1984).
119. There is no relevant legislative history discussing the current version of California
Civil Code section 3344(a).
120. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
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a voice would further the logical purpose of the statute which, on its face,
appears to be to protect the artist.121 Although, no legislative history
exists to confirm this intent, an examination of one of the primary princi-
ples of statutory construction mandates this result.'22
One mainstay in statutory construction is to construe a statute as a
whole in order to further its general purpose and intent.123 The particu-
lar meaning of a single word should be construed in light of the purpose
behind the entire statute. 124 The United States Supreme Court adhered
to this statutory principal in Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & Steamship
Co. 125 The Lawson case turned on the interpretation of the word "disa-
bility" in section 8(f)(1) of the Harbbr Workers' Compensation Act.'
26
Under one interpretation, the entire burden of compensating a per-
manently disabled employee would fall on the employer.' 27 This con-
struction would discourage an employer from hiring partially disabled
employees who have the potential of becoming permanently disabled,
thereby denying employment to this type of individual. 128 Under the
other interpretation of the term "disability," part of the payment would
derive from the employer and part from a special federal injury fund.
129
The Court found that following the former interpretation would
"destroy one of the major purposes of the... [statute]: the prevention of
employer discrimination against handicapped workers."' 30 The Court
further reasoned that Congress would not intend such a result.' 3 ' Thus,
the Court held that the latter interpretation of the term "disability" must
control.1
32
Likewise, the Midler court could have applied the same type of stat-
utory analysis. Qualifying the term "voice" to mean the artist's "actual"
voice limits the statute's broad language. Such a reading derogates the
obvious purpose behind the entire statute, which is to protect the artist
121. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1984).
122. See SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 (4th ed. 1984).
123. Id., § 46.05, at 91. See also Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201
(1949); Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal. 2d 794, 799-800, 147 P.2d 387, 390 (1944); In re Philpott, 163
Cal. App. 3d 1152, 1156, 210 Cal. Rptr. 95, 97 (1985); American Friends Serv. Comm. v.
Procunier, 33 Cal. App. 3d 252, 261, 109 Cal. Rptr. 22, 28 (1973); Mazza v. Austin, 25 Cal.
App. 2d 85, 87-88, 76 P.2d 533, 535 (1938).
124. SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05, at 92 (4th ed. 1984).
125. 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949).
126. Id. at 199-200.
127. Id. at 201.
128. Id. at 202.
129. Id. at 200.
130. Id. at 201.
131. Id. at 202.
132. Id. at 206.
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from commercial exploitation. 133 Therefore, the court should have con-
strued the statute to encompass any unauthorized use of a voice, includ-
ing an imitating voice. As one commentator aptly stated, "[i]f the
language [of the statute] is susceptible of two constructions, one which
will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive
the former construction." 134 Although the Midler court ultimately pro-
tected Midler under common law, 135 it could have provided protection
under section 3344 by construing the terms of the statute to comport
with the general purpose behind the statute.
136
b. comparison of Ne w York and California law
As suggested earlier, the amendment which added the term "voice"
to section 3344 is not accompanied by any legislative history indicating
the intent of the legislature.13 7 Consequently, it would be reasonable for
California courts to determine the scope of section 3344 by examining
similar laws from other entertainment-oriented jurisdictions. For exam-
ple, New York and California have a common interest in protecting the
artists who work in their respective states, and are such vital components
of the states' economies. 138 In addition, both states have statutes con-
taining similar language.139 New York Civil Rights Law section 51140 is
133. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.4[E][1], at 6-26 to -26.1.
134. SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05, at 91 (4th ed. 1984).
135. See supra notes 222-83 and accompanying text for a discussiorn of the misappropriation
doctrine.
136. The court in Rickard v. Auto Publisher, Inc stated that although the goal can be ac-
complished by extending common law, it is much more efficient and effective to use laws en-
acted through legislation. 735 F.2d 450, 457 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
137. See supra text accompanying note 122.
138. California and New York are the centers of entertainment in the United States. There
are 228 production companies located in California and 165 production companies located in
New York. See J., KLAIN, INTERNATIONAL MOTION PICTURE ALMANAC 467-528 (1989).
The number of production companies in these two states is far greater than that in any other
state. Id. The state to come nearest is Florida with six production companies. Id. Further-
more, the United States Department of Commerce confirmed that in 1982, California and New
York gained more revenue from the entertainment industry than did any other state in the
Union. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982 CENSUS OF SER-
VICE INDUSTRIES-GEOGRAPHIC AREA SERIES UNITED STATES 39 (1982). California had
3,978 motion picture production, distribution and service establishments with gross receipts of
$5,715,912, and New York had 1,516 establishments with gross receipts of $1,970,663. Id.
Finally, the California Film Commission stated that in 1988, California and New York led the
country in film production: California companies made 210 feature films, New York's made
62 and Florida's trailed with 17. L.A. MAG., Mar. 1989, at 28. The Commission also esti-
mated that California's film output increased the state's economy by 220 million dollars. Id.
139. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1984) with N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (Mc-
Kinney 1976).
140. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976).
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similar to section 3344, but does not include the terms "voice" or "signa-
ture."'14 ' It protects "any person whose name, portrait orpicture is used
...for advertising purposes ... without the written consent first ob-
tained... "142 The New York courts have construed the term "picture"
not only to mean a picture of the plaintiff, but also a picture of a person
resembling the plaintiff that was intended to "convey the idea that it was
the plaintiff." 14 3 Conversely, the California courts have not yet had the
opportunity to interpret the similar provision in section 3344 regarding
pictures. However, one could infer from Midler that the Ninth Circuit
would narrowly construe the language of the California statute to refer
only to the artist's own image, not an imitator's image. Instead of limit-
ing the construction of the state statute, the Ninth Circuit should follow
New York's example by broadly interpreting the statute to protect the
entertainment community within the state.
Although New York's law is not controlling, its decisions could
have provided the Ninth Circuit with some guidance since the New York
cases interpret the statute which is similar to California Civil Code sec-
tion 3344.1" In Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 145 the defend-
ant, Christian Dior, used a Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis look-alike' 46 in
141. Id. Section 51 provides:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising
purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained as
above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state
against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to
prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any
injuries sustained by reason of such use ....
Id.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 611, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254,
261 (1984), aff'd without opinion, 110 A.D.2d 1095, 488 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1985). See also Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (court construed "portrait or picture" to
include any representation which is recognizable and can be identified as complaining party);
Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("If a picture so used is a clear
and identifiable likeness of a living person, he or she is entitled to recover damages suffered by
reason of such use .... "); Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 210 N.Y. 51, 57, 103 N.E. 1108,
1110 (1913) (plaintiff was represented in photograph by another, and court held that "[a]
picture within the meaning of the statute is not necessarily a photograph of the living person,
but includes any representation of such person. The picture.., was intended to be, and it was,
a representation of the plaintiff."); Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographing Co., 192 A.D. 251, 256,
182 N.Y.S. 428, 431 (1920) (sketch slightly deviating from plaintiff's actual appearance would
not preclude cause of action under section 51); Young v. Greneker Studios, Inc., 175 Misc.
1027, 1028, 26 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (1941) (court interpreted section 51 to encompass represen-
tation of plaintiff by mannequin created in her image).
144. See supra note 141 for the text of New York Civil Rights Law section 51.
145. 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1984), aff'd without opinion, 110 A.D.2d 1095,
488 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1985).
146. The term "look-alike" refers to one who imitates an artist's visual being and manner of
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an advertisement to create the impression "that the designer name[ ] [is]
readily associated and become[s] synonymous with a certain status and
class of qualities."147 The fact that the defendant intended to create the
image of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis was undisputed. 4 Cognizant of
the fact that Onassis "never permitted her name or picture to be used in
connection with the promotion of commercial products," 149 the defen-
dant contacted Ron Smith Celebrity Look-Alikes seeking an Onassis
look-alike.15 0 Smith's agency provided Dior with Barbara Reynolds, a
secretary who looked remarkably like Onassis, in Dior's advertise-
ment.
151
The question before the New York court was whether Civil Rights
Law section 51 could be broadly construed to encompass not merely the
actual picture of the plaintiff, but also any representation of that per-
son. 1 52 The answer was a resounding "yes."'' 53 The court stated that:
If a person is unwilling to give his or her endorsement to help
sell a product, either at an offered price or at any price, no mat-
ter-hire a double and the same effect is achieved.... If we
truly value the right of privacy in a world of exploitation,
where every mark of distinctiveness becomes grist for the mills
of publicity, then we must give it more than lip service and
grudging recognition. Let the word go forth-there is no free
ride. The commercial hitchhiker seeking to travel on the fame
of another will have to learn to pay the fare or stand on his own
two feet.'
54
The court suggested that even though the statute did not expressly state
that a "photographic representation" was protected, that use must have
been contemplated since the statute was intended to protect the "essence
of the person."' 55 The court reasoned that allowing an "illusionist" to
benefit at the expense of the artist "would be sanctioning an obvious
loophole to evade the statute."'' 56 The court therefore gave the statute a
expression for compensation. Telephone interview with Justin Pierce, Vice President of Spe-
cial Projects for New World Entertainment (Sept. 6, 1989).
147. Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 604, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 605, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 606, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
152. Id. at 608, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
153. Id. at 612, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 610, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
156. Id. at 612, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
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broad "common sense reading... bar[ring] easy evasion," 157 and inter-
preted the statute to protect the artist.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York employed the same test one year later in Allen v. National Video,
Inc.15 In National Video, the defendant used a Woody Allen look-alike
in an advertisement promoting National Video's "V.I.P." movie rental
membership card which enabled consumers with the card to rent movies
from National Video.'59 The photograph displayed the look-alike, Phil
Boroff, in the National Video store with tapes of some of Woody Allen's
most famous movies on the counter. 160 Boroff was made up to resemble
Allen in both his appearance and manner of expression.1 61 The court,
however, noted some physical differences between Allen and his look-
alike.1 62 Boroff's "photo show[ed] larger eyebrows, a wider face, and
more uneven complexion than [Allen's], and somewhat different glasses
than [Allen] generally [wore]." '163 Moreover, National Video contended
that it was not trying to convey an endorsement by Woody Allen himself,
but only trying to portray a Woody Allen fan "so dedicated that he ha[d]
adopted his idol's appearance and mannerisms, who is able to live out his
fantasy by receiving star treatment at National Video."'" The defendant
further maintained that New York Civil Rights Law section 51 should be
read narrowly to protect only the actual artist's image and not that of an
imitator. 65 Thus, the defendant concluded that Allen's claim should be
denied as one not contemplated within the boundaries of the statute. 66
The court adopted the test applied in Onassis 16 7 stating that, "[iun
order to find that the photograph contains [Allen's] 'portrait or picture,'
the court would have to conclude that most persons who could identify
an actual photograph of [Allen] would be likely to think that this was
actually his picture."'1 6'  Thus, the court broadly construed section 51 to
reach its conclusion that the person in the photograph need not actually
157. Id.
158. 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
159. Id. at 618.
160. Id. at 617-18. Among the tapes depicted were Allen's Annie Hall and Bananas. Two
Humphrey Bogart films, Casablanca and The Maltese Falcon were also pictured. The latter
two films are associated with Woody Allen because of his play and film, Play It Again, Sam,
which featured Allen and the spirit of Bogart. Id. at 618.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 624.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 618.
165. Id. at 618-19.
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 145-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Onassis decision.
168. National Video, 610 F. Supp. at 624.
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be the plaintiff, as long as the resemblance is so close that the viewer
would think it wag actually the artist.1 69 The court, however, declined to
determine whether the resemblance between Allen and the look-alike met
this test, and decided the case on other grounds. 170
In 1988, the court again applied this test in another case brought by
Woody Allen. In Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 17' Allen sued to
enjoin a clothing store and its advertiser for the unauthorized commer-
cial exploitation of his likeness through the use of a celebrity look-
alike. 172 As in National Vided Phil Boroff was employed as Allen's look-
alike. Boroff, while deliberately impersonating Allen, 173 was photo-
graphed in order to advertise Men's World Outlet's clothing.' 74 The
ad was placed in a magazine; however, below the picture of Boroff ap-
peared the following disclaimer: "This is a Ron Smith Celebrity Look-
Alike."1 75 Nonetheless, Allen brought suit to enjoin the future use of the
advertisement. 176
One of Allen's causes of action was a common-law action for unjust
enrichment. 177 Allen claimed that the defendants had been unjustly en-
riched through their unauthorized commercial use of his name, portrait,
picture, likeness and persona.1 78 The court stated that under this com-
mon-law argument, it would liberally construe the photograph of Boroff
to be a portrait or picture of Allen. 179 However, the court rejected the
common-law claim and instead chose to dispose of the issues under statu-
tory law. 180
The court then considered Allen's claim under section 51 of the
New York Civil Rights Law.' It did not dismiss this claim, but de-
169. Id.
170. Id. at 625. The court found it unnecessary to resolve Allen's privacy claim since he
was entitled to summary judgment under his Lanham Act claim. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1125(a) (West 1982)).
171. 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
172. Id. at 361.
173. The photograph featured Boroff with a clarinet. Men's World Outlet, 679 F. Supp. at
362. This enhanced his resemblance to Woody Allen since Allen is a clarinetist and performs
often at Michael's Pub, a New York City bistro. Id. at 362 n.2.
174. Id. at 362.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 362-63.
177. Id. at 365. For a discussion of this doctrine, see generally E. FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS 98-100 (6th ed. 1982).
178. Men's World Outlet, 679 F. Supp. at 365.
179. Id. at 365 n.7.
180. Id. at 365.
181. Id. at 367.
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clined to rule on it and again found for Allen on other grounds.182 None-
theless, the court applied the National Video standard of whether most
persons viewing the photograph of Boroff would be likely to think that it
was actually a picture of Allen. 183 The court suggested that this test
would have been met had it not been for the disclaimer below Boroff's
picture. 184 As a result of the disclaimer, the court inferred, no reasonable
person would think that it was Woody Allen pictured in the advertise-
ment.18 Yet, through its discussion of both the common-law claim and
the section 51 claim, it appears that the court was willing to find that
Allen's look-alike could be perceived as Allen.186 Had there been no dis-
claimer, the court implied, the photograph of Boroff would have been
sufficient to satisfy the "portrait or picture" requirement of the statute. 
187
In Onassis,18 8 National Video,189 and Men's -World Outlet, 19o the
standard of interpretation of section 51 is the same. In all three cases,
the courts agreed that the statute encompassed the expropriation of the
artist's likeness through the use of an imitator.191
Although the New York statute does not include the-term "voice,"
based on the New York interpretation of a "picture," "voice" would
likely be construed to include an imitator's voice as well as that of the
actual artist. 192 In fact, the Onassis court suggested that the only reason
the representation of an artist's voice was not included within the pur-
view of the statute was because the statute was drafted in 1903, before the
reproduction and dissemination of a voice was even possible. 193 Had the
New York Legislature amended section 51 to include the term "voice" as
the California Legislature did,194 Bette Midler would have undoubtedly
182. Id. at 367-68, 372. As in National Video, the court disposed of the case under the
Lanham Act since the federal law provided Allen with the same relief that he would have
received under the section 51 claim. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982)). Midler did not
claim rights under the Lanham Act; therefore, the court never addressed that issue.
183. Men's World Outlet, 679 F. Supp. at 367. See also National Video, 610 F. Supp. at 624.
184. Men's World Outlet, 679 F. Supp. at 367.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 145-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of Onassis.
189. See supra notes 158-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of National Video.
190. See supra notes 171-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of Men's World Outlet.
191. See Men's World Outlet, 679 F. Supp. at 367; National Video, 610 F. Supp. at 624;
Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 607, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
192. See supra notes 142-91 and accompanying text for the New York interpretation of the
term "picture."
193. Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 609, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
194. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3344 (West 1984).
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been protected under New York law.1 95
As in Onassis, the Midler court could have given effect to the intent
behind the entire statute, 196 rather than merely giving effect to the literal
interpretation of a few isolated words. In that way, the logical purpose of
the statute, which is to protect against the artist's commercial exploita-
tion, would have been furthered.197 Likewise, the general public policy
of protecting the artist, an integral part of the economy, 198 would have
been achieved. California Civil Code section 3344 should therefore be
construed to encompass the use of an imitating voice intending to "con-
vey the idea that it was the plaintiff['s]."' 99 The court thus could have
protected Midler through statutory law as opposed to expanding a vague
common-law tort theory.2"
2. Interpretation of "likeness"
The Midler court suggested that the term "likeness" in section 3344
"refers to a visual image not a vocal imitation."'20 1 Again, without any
legislative history to rely on, the court presented a limited interpretation
of section 3344. It provided no explanation for its assumption, but could
have been basing its opinion on "photograph" cases where the term
"likeness" naturally refers to a "visual" likeness.2 °2 In the photograph
cases, the courts appeared to have associated the word "likeness" with
"visual" simply because at that time, the statute only referred to
"photographs."
203
The meaning of "vocal" likeness had never been adjudicated be-
cause no cases had interpreted the 1984 amendment to section 3344
which includes the word "voice." The Midler court simply concluded
that the term "likeness" did not include a "vocal" likeness, 2°4 and sup-
195. See Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 609, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
196. Id. at 610, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
197. See supra notes 121-36 and accompanying text for the reasons behind construing a
statute in a manner which will further its general purpose and intent.
198. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
199. Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 611, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
200. See supra note 136 for the benefits of using statutory law in lieu of expanding common
law.
201. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
202. See, e.g., Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984); Cher v.
Forum Int'l, 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d
860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603
P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979); Eastwood v. National Enquirer, Inc., 149 Cal. App. 3d
409, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983).
203. See supra note 117 for the text of California Civil Code section 3344 as it existed in
1972.
204. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
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plied no rationale for its conclusory statement. As the Onassis court sug-
gested, this type of statute is intended to protect the "essence of the
person."20 5 Limiting the term "likeness" to a "visual" likeness permits
defendants to evade the statute through a loophole.20 6 Furthermore, the
definition of the word "likeness" includes terms such as "affinity," "sem-
blance," "copy," and "similarity."20 7 Thus, the plain meaning of the
word is not merely visual and the courts should not limit it as such.
Although the scope of section 3344 has never been adjudicated, the
First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals addressed the scope
of a similar statute in Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.2°8 In Lahr, the court
interpreted section 51 of New York's Civil Rights Law.20 9 Plaintiff Bert
Lahr attempted to place himself within the reach of section 51 by analo-
gizing his voice to a "name."210 The court rejected Lahr's contentions,
stating that the statute was very specific. 2 11 The court concluded, "[i]f
the legislature intended that whenever an anonymous speaker extolled a
commercial product a cause of action arose ... it should have used a
phrase of more general import" within the statute.212
The California Legislature did precisely that with the 1985 amend-
ments to section 3344, by including the terms "voice" and "likeness"
within the statute.213 By doing so, the legislature created "a phrase of
more general import" '214 which should embody a vocal imitation. Sec-
tion 3344 is exactly the type of statute that the First Circuit implied was
needed to protect Lahr.215 Ironically, the Ninth Circuit had the benefit
of this type of statute but instead opted to extend amorphous common-
law tort theories to protect Midler.21 6
205. Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 610, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 260; see supra notes 145-57 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the Onassis case.
206. Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 612, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
207. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 487 (1961). For a similar argument see
Weinstein, Commercial Appropriation of Name or Likeness Revisited, 22 BEVERLY HILLS L.J.
192, 197 (1988).
208. 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
209. Id. at 258.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. The court protected Lahr on other grounds. See infra notes 265-72 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the Lahr case.
213. Act effective Jan. 1, 1985, ch. 1704, § 2, 1984 Cal. Stat. 6172 (codified as amended at
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1984)).
214. Lahr, 300 F.2d at 258.
215. Id.
216. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. See supra note 136 for the benefits of using statutory law in
lieu of expanding common law.
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B. The Common-Law Doctrines
The common-law right of publicity recognizes a right in the value of
a person's name or likeness, thereby preventing the commercial exploita-
tion of such by another person.217 This right grew out of the law of
privacy."' Professor Prosser, in his widely quoted statement, described
the law of privacy as comprised of "four distinct kinds of invasion of four
different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common
name [of privacy], but otherwise have almost nothing in common except
that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff 'to be
let alone.' "219 The four distinct invasions are: (1) intrusion upon the
plaintiff's seclusion or solitude or into the plaintiff's private affairs; (2)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3)
publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and
(4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name
or likeness.220 Prosser's fourth invasion grew into what is commonly
referred to as both the right of publicity and the misappropriation
doctrine.221
1. Misappropriation of property rights
The misappropriation doctrine was first recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in International News Service v. Associated Press.222
In that case, the Court defined misappropriation as an act by which one
217. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4.9, at 4-49.
218. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 849 (5th ed. 1984).
219. Id. Justice Brandeis and Samuel Warren popularized the legal concept of a person's
right "to be let alone." See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890). However, the phrase "right to privacy" first appeared in T. COOLEY, LAW OF
TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). Prosser expanded the concept, which is now the widely-accepted
definition quoted by many courts. See, eg., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 571-73, 574 n.11 (1977) (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 806-07 (4th ed.
1971)).
220. W. PROSSER, supra note 218, at 804-14.
221. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.6 at 5-48.1 to -49. See also supra notes 97-102
and accompanying text.
222. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). International News Service involved a dispute between two news
wire services, Associated Press (AP) and International News Service (INS). Id. at 231. Both
parties were in the business of gathering news from all parts of the world and distributing it
daily to its subscribers for publication in their newspapers. Id. at 229. Because AP was an east
coast service, it received news from Europe before INS, which was a west coast service, Id. at
238. When news of World War I was wired to the United States, INS copied the news from
bulletin boards and from early editions of AP's newspapers on the east coast, and sold the
news to INS customers on the west coast. Id. AP brought an action to restrain the pirating of
its news by INS. Id. at 231.
The Supreme Court remarked that INS had taken material that had "been acquired by
[AP] as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money .. " Id. at
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procures something of value belonging to someone else, and sells it as if it
were his or her own. 2 3 The Court condemned this activity, thereby
preventing the defendant from "endeavoring to reap where it ha[d] not
sown."
224
The misappropriation doctrine has matured into a discrete body of
law.22 5 One commentator described the misappropriation doctrine as "a
state law, judge-made offshoot of the general law of unfair competition
... usually invoked by a plaintiff who has what he considers a valuable
commercial 'thing' which he sees that another has taken or appropriated
at little cost."' 226 Three elements comprise a prima facie case of misap-
propriation: (1) the plaintiff must have invested a substantial amount of
time, effort and money into the thing that was misappropriated so that a
court could determine that the interest in the misappropriated "thing"
was a property right; (2) the defendant has appropriated the "thing" at
little or no cost, such that the court can characterize the defendant's ac-
tions as "reap[ing] where it has not sown;, 227 and (3) the plaintiff has
been injured as a result of the defendant's misappropriation.2 2 8
The California Legislature created Civil Code section 3344229 to em-
body this common-law doctrine of misappropriation. 2 30 The Midler v.
Ford Motor CO. 2 3 1 court refused to protect Midler under section 3344,232
a statute seemingly designed to protect persons in her position,23 3 yet
granted her relief under the common-law rule from which the statute was
derived.2 34 The court first looked to the language in California Civil
239. In so doing, INS had "appropriat[ed] to itself the harvest of those who ha[d] sown." Id.
at 239-40. Thus, the Court awarded damages to AP. Id.
223. Id. at 239.
224. Id. at 239-40.
225. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.6[B][1], at 5-50.
226. Id.
227. International News Service, 248 U.S. at 239-40.
228. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.6[B][1], at 5-50 to -51; see also Jacobs v. Robitaille,
406 F. Supp. 1145 (D.N.H. 1976).
229. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1984). See supra notes 109-216 and accompanying text
for discussion of California Civil Code section 3344.
230. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 819 n.6, 603 P.2d 425, 428 n.6, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 326 n.6 (1979). Section 3344 has also been said to have embodied the right of
publicity indicating that the two terms are used interchangeably. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 6.4[F][8], at 6-39. See also supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
231. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
232. Id. at 463.
233. See supra notes 109-216 and accompanying text for a discussion of California Civil
Code section 3344.
234. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. See generally J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.4[A], at 6-15
to -16.
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Code section 990235 which states that the rights accorded a deceased in-
dividual, including voice, are property rights.236 The court concluded
that, by analogy, the common-law rights are also property rights which
can be appropriated.2 37 However, since voice is not traditionally a com-
mon-law right,238 the court, in essence, expanded common-law property
rights to include voice by reference to a statute which is specifically lim-
ited to the rights of deceased individuals.239
The court should not have looked to section 990, a post-mortem
statute, but should have looked to the corresponding statute for living
persons, section 3344.2 0 If the court had looked to section 3344 to sup-
port its property rights argument, it would have found that the language
defining these rights as property rights in section 990 was conspicuously
missing from section 3344.241 It has been held that "'[w]here a statute,
with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of
such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is sig-
nificant to show that a different intention existed.' 242 If the legislature
did not intend a living person's voice to be a property right, the court
should not have circumvented this intent by using section 990's creation
of property rights in deceased individuals, to apply to a living person.
Instead of looking to an inapplicable statute to change the common-
law definition of property rights, the court could have looked to the ex-
isting common-law rule regarding property rights to determine whether
the defendants committed the tort of misappropriation. 243 An historical
analysis of the common law will reveal that the court erred in granting
Midler rights in her voice under the common-law rule of misap-
235. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1984). See supra note 76 for the relevant text of section
990.
236. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
237. Id.
238. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 906 (1971); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Da-
vis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
239. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. See also Anderson, Celebrities Have Rights in Their Per-
sonas, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 20, 1988, at 4, col. 3.
240. See supra notes 109-216 and accompanying text for a discussion of California Civil
Code section 3344.
241. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1984).
242. People v. Kuhn, 216 Cal. App. 2d 695, 699, 31 Cal. Rptr. 253, 256 (1963) (quoting
People v. Valentine, 28 Cal. 2d 121, 142, 169 P.2d 1, 14 (1946)). See also City of Port
Hueneme v. City of Oxnard, 52 Cal. 2d 385, 395, 341 P.2d 318, 324 (1959); People ex rel.
Paganini v. Town of Corte Madera, 97 Cal. App. 2d 726, 729, 218 P.2d 810, 813 (1950).
243. Section 990 was intended to complement, not displace, the common-law rule; there-
fore, courts can still reasonably examine the common law underlying the statute. See CAL.
CIV. CODE § 990(m) (West 1984).
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propriation. 44
The California Supreme Court, in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,245
clearly articulated the law regarding misappropriation of property rights.
In Lugosi, Bela Lugosi's heirs sought to recover profits made by Univer-
sal Pictures from its commercial use of Lugosi's portrayal of the Count
Dracula character.246  Lugosi's heirs also sought to enjoin Universal
from future use of Lugosi's image without their consent.247 One of the
issues concerned whether Lugosi's portrayal of Count Dracula was a
"property right" which could descend to his heirs.248
The supreme court held that Lugosi did not retain property rights in
his portrayal of Dracula, and therefore no such rights could pass to the
plaintiffs.249 Justice Mosk, in his concurrence, stated that "[m]erely
playing a role ... creates no inheritable property right in an actor. '2 0
Mosk suggested, however, that Lugosi would have retained property
rights in the character had he been the innovator or creator of Count
Dracula.21 Here, because Lugosi had only played a role that many
others had portrayed, he did not have the exclusive right to control the
use of the Count Dracula character.
252
The above theory has been recognized for decades.253 In the early
case of Supreme Records v. Decca Records,2 54 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California noted that if it were to pre-
vent imitation of performances, "[it] would have to hold that ... for
instance ... Sir Laurence Olivier could prohibit anyone else from adopt-
ing some of the innovations which he biought to the performance of
Hamlet."25 However, Justice Mosk's concurrence in Lugosi did not in-
244. The court should have protected Midler under California Civil Code section 3344, the
statutory codification of the misappropriation doctrine. See supra notes 109-216 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of section 3344.
245. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
246. Id. at 817, 603 P.2d at 427, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 822-23, 603 P.2d at 430-31, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29.
250. Id. at 825, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (Mosk, J., concurring).
251. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
252. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
253. See generally Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co.,
300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (1982); Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F. Supp. 904
(S.D. Cal. 1950); Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928).
254. 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
255. Id. at 909.
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dicate that an actor could never have a property right in a character.256
An exception existed if the character was "an original creation of a fic-
tional figure played exclusively by its creator."2 7
Justice Mosk referred to Groucho Marx as an example of this excep-
tion because he actually "created" the distinctive character which he
portrayed. 58 Coincidentally, two years later Groucho Marx Productions
v. Day & Night Co. was decided. 59 According to that case, Groucho
Marx had assigned property rights in his name, likeness, and style of his
character to his production company. 60 The production company later
brought suit, claiming that the defendant had appropriated these rights
by simulating the unique style of the Marx Brothers in a play.261
The Marx court held that the Marx Brothers had property rights in
the characters they had created. 62 Their "fame arose as a direct result
of their efforts to develop instantly recognizable.and popular stage char-
acters, having no relation to their real personalities. ' 2 63 Thus, the court
held, commercial value could be transferred in the unique characters that
they created, not merely portrayed. 2 4
256. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 825, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (Mosk, J., con-
curring).
257. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
258. Id. at 825-26, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (Mosk, J., concurring). An earlier
case that falls within this exception is Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928).
In Chaplin, the plaintiffs claimed-that the defendants had misappropriated Chaplin's unique
character, which he originally created and portrayed. Id. at 359-60, 269 P. at 544. Chaplin
invented and perfected the make-up, clothing, and mannerisms of his character. Id. at 359,
269 P. at 544. The defendants produced several films with Amador imitating Chaplin as
"Charlie Aplin." Id. at 360-61, 269 P. at 545. The court held that the defendants could not
appropriate Chaplin's rights in his character since Chaplin was the "first person to originate,
use, combine, and perfect in motion pictures that certain form of acting, those mannerisms,
facial expressions, and movements of his body." Id. at 362, 269 P. at 545.
Similarly, in Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., the court determined that the plaintiffs,
Stanley Laurel's and Oliver Hardy's heirs, had property rights in the decedents' names and
likenesses. 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Price court therefore held that the
defendant's use of these property rights amounted to misappropriation. Id. at 847. The Price
court reasoned that, in light of the Lugosi decision, Price's case was easy to decide. Id. at 845.
Unlike Lugosi, the court reasoned, Laurel and Hardy "portray[ed] themselves and develop[ed]
their own characters rather than fictional characters which ha[d] been given a particular inter-
pretation by an actor." Id.
259. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (1982).
260. Id. at 486.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 491.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 492. The district court was later reversed by the Second Circuit because it ap-
plied New York law when it should have applied California law. Groucho Marx Prods. v, Day
& Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 319-20 (2d Cir. 1982). The Second Circuit stated that under
current California law, the right of publicity terminates at death. Id. at 320. Thus, for the
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Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.2" 5 also falls within this exception. In
Lahr, the defendant, in order to sell a product, used a cartoon of a duck
in a commercial accompanied by the voice of a sound-alike imitating
Lahr's distinctive voice.266 Lahr alleged misappropriation of his "crea-
tive talent, voice, vocal sounds and vocal comic delivery." '26 7
Holding for Lahr, but remanding for further proceedings, the court
stated that Lahr achieved notoriety because of his "style of vocal comic
delivery... distinctive and original combination of pitch, inflection, ac-
cent and comic sounds." '268 The court implied that Lahr's individual vo-
cal style was his own creation, and therefore not connected with a
character or work which was the creation of another.26 9 Unlike Midler,
the defendant had not purchased the rights in another's character that
Lahr had simply portrayed, but had actually simulated Lahr's "unique
and extraordinary comic character."270 The court did not deny that
Lahr had a property right in his own unique voice, since what the de-
fendant sought was Lahr's vocal creation,27 and not merely his perform-
ance of another writer's innovations. Thus, like the Marx Brothers, Lahr
had created and not merely performed his unique characterizations.
While Lahr is similar to Midler in that it deals with imitation of
one's voice, the similarity ends there. Lahr is distinguishable in that
Lahr's voice was used in a unique manner2 72 and was not fixed in any
particular song copyrighted by another individual. By contrast, Midler
sang a song created by another person.273 In that sense, Midler's per-
formance was not a unique creation, but more akin to Bela Lugosi's por-
trayal of Dracula.274 Just as the character of Count Dracula has been
purposes of this case, the court suggested that the fact Groucho Marx represented an "original
creation" played exclusively by its creator was irrelevant because no rights could pass to his
heirs. Id. at 322-23 n.6. However, the court implied that Groucho Marx would have had a
property right in his "original creation" during his lifetime. Id.
It should be noted that the enactment of California Civil Code section 990 created public-
ity rights in deceased individuals. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1984). Therefore, the
Second Circuit's narrow interpretation of California law is now unfounded.
265. 300 F.2d 256 (Ist Cir. 1962).
266. Id. at 257.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 257-58.
270. Id. at 257.
271. Id. at 259.
272. Id. at 257.
273. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. The Lahr court stated in dictum that it would "hesitate to
say that an ordinary singer whose voice, deliberately or otherwise, sounded sufficiently like
another to cause confusion was not free to do so." Lahr, 300 F.2d at 259.
274. See supra notes 245-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lugosi case.
January 1990]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:601
portrayed by many actors, 75 the song, "Do You Want To Dance," has
been performed by many singers.z 76 Thus, since the Lugosi court found
that Bela Lugosi did not have a property interest in his characterization
of Count Dracula 7 so should the Midler court have found that Bette
Midler did not have a property right in her version2 71 of "Do You Want
To Dance." Without a property interest there can be no common-law
tort of misappropriation279 and Midler's cause of action should have
failed.
280
Since Midler would have been denied relief under California's estab-
lished interpretation of misappropriation of a property right,28' the
Ninth Circuit erred in granting her relief under that theory of recov-
ery.2 2 The court clothed Midler's cause of action in "misappropriation"
garb283 when actually it was more appropriately dressed as a section 3344
action. Had the court employed section 3344, it could have protected
Midler without having to contradict seemingly dispositive state-law pre-
cedent regarding the misappropriation doctrine.
2. Prior precedent: Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
By protecting Midler under a misappropriation theory, the court
essentially broadened the right of publicity28 4 to protect a performer's
voice, which had never before been protected.2 5 Traditionally, the right
of publicity was invoked only to protect the commercial exploitation of
275. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 825, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (Mosk, J., con-
curring).
276. The song "Do You Want To Dance" has been recorded by eleven artists, including
Bette Midler. See PHONOLOG REPORTER 103-57B (1989).
.277. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 822-23, 603 P.2d at 430-31, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29.
278. Although the court actually protected Midler's voice, it should have only protected
Midler's rendition of the song, since a voice has never been recognized as a common-law prop-
erty right. See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716; Lahr, 300 F.2d at 259; Booth, 362 F. Supp. at 345;
Davis, 297 F. Supp. at 1147.
279. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.6[B][1], at 5-51.
280. It should be noted that although the court erred in protecting Midler under the misap-
propriation doctrine, she still could have recovered under a broad reading of California Civil
Code section 3344. See supra notes 109-216.
281. See supra notes 245-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lugosi.
282. The court could have granted Midler relief under existing statutory law. See supra
notes 109-216 for a discussion of California Civil Code section 3344.
283. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
284. As previously stated, the right of publicity encompasses early common-law rights such
as misappropriation and unfair competition. See J. McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.6[A], at 5-
48.1 to -49. Therefore, these terms are commonly used interchangeably. See supra notes 97-
102 and accompanying text.
285. See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716; Booth, 362 F. Supp. at 345; Davis, 297 F. Supp. at 1147.
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one's name and likeness.2" 6 By extending this right to protect one's
voice, the court essentially overruled an eighteen-year-old rule estab-
lished by Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,287 a case with facts
virtually indistinguishable from those in Midler.28 s
In Sinatra, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company devised a tire ad-
vertising campaign with the help of the advertising agency of Young &
Rubicam. 28 9 The agency named the new line of tires "wide boots" in
order to utilize an idea for a television commercial incorporating "These
Boots Are Made For Walkin'," a song made famous by Nancy Sina-
tra.290 As in Midler, the defendant first approached Sinatra to partici-
pate in the commercial and, like Midler, no contract was negotiated.29'
The defendant nonetheless produced the commercial, hiring a Sinatra
sound-alike to sing the song while four girls appeared on stage dressed in
the distinctive Sinatra style.292 Sinatra brought an action against the de-
fendant, alleging that she was so identified with the song that her rendi-
tion of it acquired a secondary meaning.293 She further alleged that the
defendant's purpose was to deceive the public into believing that Sinatra
endorsed the product.2 94
Although the defendant admitted it was imitating Sinatra's rendi-
tion of the song, the Ninth Circuit refused to protect Sinatra's publicity
rights.295 The case was dismissed on grounds that Sinatra's interests con-
flicted with federal copyright law.29 6 The court stated that the defendant
286. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Factors
Etc., Inc., v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979);
Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc.,
441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 953 (1980); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Uhlander v. Hen-
dricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D.C. Minn. 1970); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc.,
58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977).
287. 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
288. However, Sinatra is distinguishable from Midler on the basis of the legal arguments
made, since, at the time Sinatra was decided, California Civil Code section 3344 had not taken
effect.
289. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 713.
292. Id. at 712. Sinatra was known for wearing "mod" clothes and high boots. Id. She
alleged that the defendants intentionally dressed the girls in the commercial in that fashion to
make it appear as if Nancy Sinatra were in the commercial. Id.
293. Id. See supra text accompanying note 58 for a definition of the term "secondary
meaning."
294. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712.
295. Id. at 713.
296. Id. at 717-18.
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"paid a very substantial sum to the copyright proprietor to obtain the
license for the use of the song and all of its arrangements. '297 To make a
copyright proprietor obtain permission from each artist who sang the
particular song in question, the court reasoned, would impose too much
of a burden on the proprietor.298 Thus, Sinatra was denied relief.299
The Midler court distinguished Sinatra, which is factually identical
to the Midler case, by stating that "if Midler were claiming a secondary
meaning to 'Do You Want To Dance' or seeking to prevent the defend-
ants from using that song, she would fail like Sinatra."'3"° In effect, Mid-
ler was asking for the same relief as Sinatra.30 1 However, the court
reasoned that because Midler did not assert that imitation of her voice
resulted in unfair competition, her cause of action would be upheld. 2
Yet peculiarly, the court protected Midler under the misappropriation
doctrine,30 3 which is an offshoot of the law of unfair competition.3"
Essentially, Midler invoked the same rights as Sinatra; and there-
fore, the rule in Sinatra should have governed the outcome in Midler.30 5
Moreover, in both cases, the defendants had obtained the copyright to a
song that had been sung by many other performers. 30 6 Neither Sinatra
nor Midler was trying to protect the song itself, but rather each wished to
protect her particular version of the song.307 Each artist wanted to pre-
vent the imitation of her individual rendition so that the public would
not identify her with the advertisement.30 8 By affording Midler protec-
tion that it did not grant Sinatra, the Ninth Circuit essentially created a
legal distinction without a factual one. The effect of the Midler decision
is extremely significant because without expressly stating it, the court
297. Id. at 717.
298. Id. at 718.
299. Id.
300. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
301. See supra note 278.
302. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
303. Id. at 463. See supra notes 222-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
misappropriation doctrine.
304. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.6 [B][1], at 5-50. See also supra text accompany-
ing note 226.
305. However, unlike Sinatra, the court had the benefit of California Civil Code section
3344 and could have granted Midler relief under that statute, rather than relying on amor-
phous tort theories. See supra note 136 for the advantages of using statutory law in lieu of
extending common law. See also supra notes 109-216 and accompanying text for a discussion
of California Civil Code section 3344.
306. See supra note 276 for the number of singers who have recorded "Do You Want To
Dance." The song "These Boots Are Made For Walkin'" has been recorded by five artists
including Nancy Sinatra. See PHONOLOG REPORTER, supra note 276, at 119-57A.
307. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462; Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712. See also supra note 278.
308. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463; Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712.
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effectively overruled Sinatra. It afforded protection where it had never
been given before-to a performer's voice in a copyrighted song.3 °9
C. Preemption Under Federal Law
Although the court provided Midler with state law protection,31°
the question remains as to whether her claim should have been pre-
empted by federal law. The doctrine of preemption arises from the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 311 The Supremacy
Clause essentially states that the Constitution and the federal laws cre-
ated pursuant to the Constitution shall remain supreme over the laws of
the states.312 The question of whether a state law is void under the
Supremacy Clause involves a consideration of whether that law "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress. ' ' 313 The Copyright Clause of the United
States Constitution314 provides Congress with the power "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries. ' 315 Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws in actual
conflict with Congress' enactment of federal legislation under any au-
thorizing clause, in this context the Copyright Clause, will be struck
down, or "preempted.
316
The Midler v. Ford Motor Co. 317 court suggested that if Midler had
alleged unfair competition, as alleged in Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
309. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. One court suggested that it would protect a performer's
voice, but only for a work which was his own original creation. See Lahr, 300 F.2d at 257,
259. See also supra notes 265-72 and accompanying text.
310. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988). The court protected
Midler under the common-law doctrine of misappropriation. See supra notes 222-83 for a
discussion of misappropriation.
311. U.S. CONST. art. VI. Article six of the United States Constitution states in pertinent
part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. (emphasis added).
312. Id.
313. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
314. U.S. CONS. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
315. Id.
316. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-26, at 481 (2d ed. 1988).
317. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
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ber Co.,3 18 Midler too would have been preempted.319 However, after the
1976 amendments were added to the Copyright Act,320 the fact that Mid-
ler did not allege unfair competition would not have saved her from pre-
emption. Section 114(b) of Title 17,321 which was part of the 1976
amendments, 322 may apply to preempt Midler's cause of action even
though she did not allege unfair competition.3 23 Section 114(b) has never
been applied since the only right of publicity cases regarding one's voice
arose before that section was enacted.324 To determine whether a resolu-
tion of this issue can be reached, the common law and sections 301 and
114(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976325 must be analyzed.
1. The preemption cases
Before Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, which became
effective in 1978,326 the United States Supreme Court decided several im-
portant preemption cases under the old copyright law.327 A better un-
derstanding of the congressional intent behind the 1976 Act can be
obtained by examining these cases.
a. the Sears-Compco cases
The federal preemption theory regarding copyright laws was first
examined in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 328 and its companion
case, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.329 In the Sears-Compco
cases, the defendants copied unpatentable lighting designs, and the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed their liability under the state law of unfair competi-
tion.330 The United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of
whether state unfair-competition laws could prevent the copying of de-
318. 435 F.2d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
319. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
320. Copyright Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 101-810, 90 Stat. 2541-
2602 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
321. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982).
322. Copyright Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 114(b), 90 Stat. 2541, 2560
(1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982)).
323. See supra note 49 for the relevant text of Title 17, section 114(b),
324. See cases cited supra note 238.
325. 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(b), 301 (1982).
326. Copyright Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 101-810, 90 Stat. 2541,
2598 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
327. See, e.g., Sears, Rdebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
328. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
329. 376 U.S. 234 (1964):
330. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 376 U.S.
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signs that were too common to warrant protection under either federal
patent or copyright law.331 The Court held that under the Supremacy
Clause, the states could not protect these designs as such protection
would conflict with the Copyright Clause's grant to Congress of power to
protect certain inventions. 332 To allow the state to protect the design
would contravene the federal policy of "allowing free access to copy
whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public
domain.,3
3
b. the Goldstein-Kewanee cases
The Court again addressed the preemption doctrine in Goldstein v.
California3 4 and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.335 In Goldstein, the
defendant was criminally convicted under a California statute336 for
copying an original sound recording without the author's consent. 337
The Court upheld the defendant's conviction, thereby rejecting the de-
fendant's contention that the Sears-Compco decisions should govern and
the state's law should be preempted by the 1909 Copyright Act.338 The
Court reaffirmed Sears and Compco, but held that the 1909 Act did not
preempt the state statute since the Act did not list sound recordings as
protected by copyright. 3 9 The Court reasoned that no preemption could
occur if Congress had not expressly spoken on the matter in question.340
Goldstein somewhat narrowed the Sears-Compco holdings which had
suggested that the states could not pass a law that would effectively pro-
vide any copyright protection. 41 However, the Court continued to rec-
ognize preemption where Congress expressly creates a conflicting federal
225 (1964); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 30 (7th Cir. 1962), rev'd,
376 U.S. 234 (1964).
331. Sears, 376 U.S. at 225-26; Compco, 376 U.S. at 234.
332. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32; Compco, 376 U.S. at 237.
333. Compco, 376 U.S. at 237. See also Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32.
334. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
335. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
336. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653(h) (West 1988).
337. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 548. California Penal Code section 653(h) prohibits the copying
of works which are not entitled to federal protection. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653(h) (West
1988).
338. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 571.
339. Id. at 566. The 1909 Act was later amended in 1971 to provide copyright protection
for sound recordings. Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, §§ 1(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 26, 101(e), 85
Stat. 391 (1971) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 26, 101(e) (1982)). The 1976 Act
explicitly protects sound recordings. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1982).
340. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 566.
341. Id. at 569-70.
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law.3 42
In Kewanee, the Court qualified its holding in Goldstein. The
Kewanee Court was faced with the issue of whether federal patent law
would preempt state trade-secret law . 43 The Court adopted the follow-
ing test to determine whether federal law preempted state law: If the
state statute or common law "[stood] as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," then
the state law would be preempted. 3 "
Applying this test, the Court determined that trade-secret laws did
not contravene federal patent law policies of encouraging and rewarding
new invention, promoting disclosure of inventions and assuring that
ideas remain free in the public domain.3 45 The Court stated that federal
patent law and state trade-secret law provided two different forms of in-
centive to invention.346 Federal patent law, the Court observed, provided
an "inventor" a seventeen-year "monopoly" in a machine, process, or
device.347 The Court then noted that the state trade-secret law at issue
did not protect a "discoverer" against independent discovery of the
"secret" by others.3 48 In this way, the Court reasoned, the state law
encouraged invention and did not remove any ideas from the public do-
main.3 49 Therefore, the Court held that since the purpose of the state
law was in accord with that of the federal law, 350 there would be no
preemption.351
2. The Copyright Act of 1976
The Copyright Act of 1976352 created a system of protection for all
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion., 35 3 In light of the Supreme Court's holdings in the Sears-Compco
342. Id. at 571.
343. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 472.
344. Id. at 479 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
345. Id. at 484.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 477-78 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1965)).
348. Id. at 475-76.
349. Id. at 484-85.
350. Id. at 493.
351. The preemption cases suggest that a state law will be preempted only if it directly
conflicts with a federal law or if it clashes with the objectives of a federal law. See generally
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
352. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
353. Id. § 102(a). The following works of authorship are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, and therefore are granted copyright protection: "(1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying
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cases,354 Congress added section 301311 to the new Act to deal with pre-
emption of state common law or statutes.356 In drafting section 301, leg-
islative history indicates that Congress intended it "to be stated in the
clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any
conceivable misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress
shall act preemptively, and to avoid the development of any vague bor-
derline areas between State and Federal protection.
357
Unfortunately, Congress missed the mark. The language of section
301 is not clear and unequivocal, but rather is riddled with ambigui-
ties. 358 Professor Nimmer articulated the two-tiered standard embodied
in section 301:
Any state law (whether based upon' common law or statute)
will be subject to federal preemption under Section 301 if: (1)
such law creates "legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings." Id.
354. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32; Compco, 376 U.S. at 237. See supra notes 326-51 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of the preemption cases.
355. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
356. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5747. Section 301 provides in pertinent part:
(a) [A]II legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of author-
ship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 ... are governed exclusively
by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in
any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State with respect to-
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in any
tangible medium of expression; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a)-(b)(1), (3) (1982) (emphasis added).
357. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5746.
358. For example, Congress initially included in the bill a list of state claims which would
not be preempted by the Copyright Act. This early bill read:
§ 301(b)(3): activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright.., including rights
against misappropriation not equivalent to any such exclusive rights, breaches of
contract, breaches of trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, defamation, and
deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false representation.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24.
The above list was inexplicably excluded from the final version of the statute. See 17
U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Consequently, the courts are left to deal with the problem of whether
certain state law causes of action are equivalent to federal copyright law.
January 1990]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:601
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright
as specified by section 106,''133 91 and if, in addition, (2) such
rights under such state law may be claimed in "works of au-
thorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sec-
tions 102 and 103, whether created before or after [January 1,
1978] and whether published or unpublished .... .1360
The vagueness of the statute's language has resulted in a dual interpreta-
tion of this standard. Thus, the next two sections demonstrate that it can
be used to both support and defeat the preemption of Bette Midler's right
of publicity cause of action. Furthermore, new tension between the state
common-law right of publicity and the federal copyright law are ex-
plored, since the Midler case involved the right of publicity as it related
to the protection of one's "voice," as opposed to its traditional protection
of one's "name or likeness." ''
a. reasons to oppose federal preemption
The arguments against federal preemption and for the survival of
Midler's state cause of action reveal that under the first tier, 62 preemp-
tion will occur only if the legal rights afforded by the state action are
equivalent to any of the federal rights alluded to in section 106.363 The
rights of section 106 that would have been pertinent to the Midler case
were those rights provided to the copyright owner "to prepare derivative
359. Section 106 of Title 17 provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
360. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B], at 1-9 to -10 (1978)
[hereinafter M. NIMMER] (footnotes omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (emphasis added)).
361. This area has not been explored since, prior to Midler, the right of publicity was lim-
ited to protection of one's "name or likeness." See, e.g., Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749
F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).
362. See supra notes 359-60 and accompanying text.
363. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
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works based upon the copyrighted work." 3" One commentator has in-
terpreted the term "equivalent" very narrowly.3 6 5 If by merely repro-
ducing, performing, distributing, or displaying the copyrighted work, the
defendants infringe upon a state-created right, then the state law is pre-
empted.366 However, this commentator concludes, if any additional ele-
ment is required to abrogate the state law, then the two laws are not
equivalent and the state law can survive.367
Employing this analysis, Midler's cause of action would not be pre-
empted under the first tier. If by merely copying the song in which the
defendants owned a copyright violated Midler's right of publicity under
California law, then her cause of action would be preempted by federal.
law because the California law would be in direct conflict with section
106. However, those opposed to preemption would argue that since the
defendants imitated Midler's persona as well as the song,368 an additional
element was present to complete the state cause of action. Her state-law-
created claim, therefore, should not be preempted under the first tier of
the analysis.
The second tier of the analysis deals with the nature of the works
subject to preemption.369 In order to be preempted, a work must be fixed
in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of
sections 102 and 103.370 Those against federal preemption would suggest
that through the right of publicity, the artist is not protecting a recorded
work, but is protecting his or her persona.171 Since apersona is not fixed
in a tangible medium of expression,372 it is not within the subject matter
of copyright and is therefore not preempted.373 Under this analysis,
Midler's cause of action should not be preempted since her voice, an as-
pect of her persona, is not a fixed work of authorship.
364. Id. § 106(2).
365. See M. NIMMER, supra note 360, § 1.01[B], at 1-10 to -12; see also Factors Etc., Inc. v.
Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1099-1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 652
F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
366. M. NIMMER, supra note 360, § 1.01[B], at 1-13.
367. Id.
368. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
369. See supra notes 359-60 and accompanying text.
370. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
371. Traditionally, courts have defined the term "persona" as the identifying aspects of
one's personality, specifically one's name and visual likeness. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 4-14[A], at 4-81. However, opponents of preemption could argue that a voice is also an
identifying feature of one's personality comprising the persona. Id. § 4-14[A], at 4-81 to -82.
372. See supra note 353 for the definition of the term "tangible medium of expression."
373. M. NIMMER, supra note 360, § 1.01[B], at 1-22 to -22.4.
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b. reasons to support federal preemption
Federal preemption supporters would extinguish Midler's cause
of action. They suggest a different analysis of the first tier regarding
equivalency.374 One commentator expressly denounced the additional-
element theory saying that "[i]f merely adding an extra element would
prevent preemption, states could easily subvert federal preemption by
simply appending a superfluous requirement to the right of publicity
laws."' 375 Congress intended a state right to be preempted unless it is
qualitatively different from the right protected under federal copyright
law.3 76 The House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act reflects this intent:
[R]ights and remedies that are different in nature from the
rights comprised in a copyright ... may continue to be pro-
tected under State common law or statute. The evolving com-
mon law rights of "privacy," "publicity," and trade secrets, and
the general laws of defamation and fraud, would remain unaf-
fected as long as the causes of action contain elements, such as
invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust or confidential-
ity, that are different in kind from copyright infringement.
3 77
374. See, e.g., Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); Universal City Studios v. The T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Harper
& Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
375. Note, Copyright and the Right of Publicity: One Pea in Two Pods?, 71 GEo. L.J. 1567,
1580 (1983).
376. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5747-48. The court in Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,
also rejected the "additional element" equivalency standard. 501 F. Supp. 848, 853-54
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court reasoned that merely because a state right requires additional
elements to be proven does not mean that the state law will evade preemption. Id. To escape
preemption, the court said, the "state cause of action must protect rights under the facts of a
particular case which are qualitatively different from the rights of reproduction, performance,
distribution, or display." Id. at 852 (emphasis in original).
377. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5748 (emphasis added). Recently, a district court in Motown Record
Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., applied this interpretation of the "equivalency" standard to
facts similar to Midler. 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D. Cal. 1987). In Motown, the defendants used
the tune of "Baby Love," made popular by The Supremes, and inserted the words "Dinty
Moore" to advertise their product. Id. at 1237. Furthermore, the defendants used the image
of The Supremes by featuring three young black women with bouffant hair and sequined for-
mal gowns singing the "Dinty Moore" song. Id. Plaintiffs sought protection under California
Civil Code section 3344 since the defendants used the image of The Supremes, as well as the
song, without permission. Id. at 1240.
The court held that in order for a state claim not to be preempted it must be "qualitatively
different" from the copyright infringement claim. Id. at 1239-40 (quoting Mayer v. Josiah
Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). The court held that since
[Vol. 23:601
January 1990] EXPANDING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Those supporting federal preemption would have analyzed the Mid-
ler case under the first tier differently than would those opposed to fed-
eral preemption. The Copyright Act itself provides a logical progression
leading to section 114(b), a section which could preempt Midler's
claim."' The progression is as follows: Section 301 leads the reader to
section 106 by indicating that if the state rights are equivalent to the
federal rights listed in section 106, those state rights will be preempted.379
Section 106(2) provides that the copyright owner has the exclusive right
"to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. ' 380 Sec-
tion 106 states that it is subject to sections 107 through 118,381 which in
turn elaborate on the copyright owner's rights. The relevant provision is
found in section 114(b).382 The Notes of the Committee on the Judiciary
for this section provide that "mere imitation of a recorded performance
would not constitute a copyright infringement even where one performer
deliberately sets out to simulate another's performance as exactly as pos-
sible."' 383 Under section 114(b), nothing prohibits an owner of a copy-
righted song from imitating the style of an artist's recording of that
song.
384
In Midler, the defendants had a copyright license to use the song
"Do You Want To Dance;" 385 therefore, they should have been afforded
protection to the fullest extent allowed by copyright law. Midler was
actually attempting to prevent the defendants from doing exactly what
the plaintiffs complained of the defendants' alleged unauthorized use of a copyrighted work,
the rights they sought were not qualitatively different from copyright law, and therefore their
state claim was preempted. Id. at 1241. By not addressing the plaintiffs' right of publicity
claim, the court implied that it thought that claim was not "qualitatively different" enough to
bring the state claim out of the zone of copyright protection.
378. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982).
379. Id. § 301 (1982).
380. Id. § 106(2).
381. Id. § 106.
382. Id. § 114(b). See supra note 49 for the relevant text of section 114(b).
383. 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(b) notes of committee on the judiciary (West 1977). In typical right
of publicity cases, some courts have found that the right of publicity would not be preempted.
See, eg., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981). However those cases dealt with a celebrity's "name or
likeness," not "voice," therefore section 114(b) was never invoked. In Midler, section 114(b)
addresses the identical right that Midler wanted to protect under state law; therefore, the
federal law should prevail.
384. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4.14[E][2], at 4-92. Even if the "additional element"
theory opposing preemption were accepted, it could be refuted under a section 114(b) analysis,
since an artist's "style," which the copyright owner is allowed to imitate, is arguably
equivalent to an artist's "persona." Because no "additional element" exists, the state and fed-
eral laws are equivalent; therefore, the state law must be preempted.
385. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
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section 114(b) allows. She sought rights in her version of the song,386
while the defendants sought the right to create any version of the song
that they wished to create. Under this analysis, preemption supporters
would argue that the rights sought by the parties were not qualitatively
"different in nature," 387 but were equivalent. When a conflict such as
this occurs, the federal statute must prevail pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.8 8
In Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes,389 the court also applied a
broader definition of the term "equivalent." In Rhodes, an Ohio statute
made it illegal for producers to sell their films through a "blind bidding"
process.3 90 The blind bidding procedure allowed motion pictures to be
licensed to a theater owner without giving the owner an opportunity to
first screen the films. 391 The producers contended that the Ohio statute
prohibiting blind bidding violated federal copyright law.392
The court upheld the Ohio statute and suggested that in order for
preemption to occur, it must be determined whether a state statute "cre-
ates, grants, or destroys any rights that are 'equivalent' to the exclusive
rights of copyright set forth in [section 106 of the 1976 Act]. 3 93 The
court observed that section 106 provides copyright owners with the
rights to prohibit reproduction, performance, distribution or display of
their work.394 If by exercising the above rights, the court held, a copy-
right owner violates a state statute, then the state statute is preempted by
the 1976 Act.3 95 In applying this test, the court stated that since the
statute did not deprive the copyright owners of the right to reproduce,
perform, distribute or display their films, or give any of these rights to
the purchasers, it would not be preempted.396
In contrast, applying this test to the Midler case would have resulted
in preemption. The state right of publicity would destroy the defendant's
rights under section 114(b), which allows the licensed defendant to ex-
actly imitate any rendition or performance of a copyrighted work.39 7
386. See supra note 278.
387. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5748.
388. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
389. 496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
390. Id. at 412-13.
391. Id. at 412.
392. Id. at 413.
393. Id. at 443.
394. Id. See supra note 359 for the text of Title 17, section 106.
395. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 443.
396. Id.
397. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982).
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Protecting Midler under a state publicity right effectively prevented the
defendants from enjoying their exclusive federal right to reproduce their
copyrighted work in any manner whatsoever. Because Midler's state-law
right of publicity interfered with the defendant's federal rights, it should
have been preempted.39
The second tier of the test3 99 could also be interpreted by preemp-
tion supporters to extinguish Midler's right of publicity cause of action.
This tier suggests that a state-created claim will be preempted if: (1) the
work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression; and (2) comes within
the subject matter of copyright under sections 102 and 103.' In Midler,
both of these requirements were met.40 1 First, Midler's rendition of "Do
You Want To Dance" was fixed in a sound recording which is a tangible
medium of expression; and second, a sound recording is expressly in-
cluded within the subject matter of section 102.402 Consequently, under
this analysis, Midler's claim should have been preempted.
0 3
3. Proposed resolution
As demonstrated above, the language of the Copyright Act supports
both views of preemption. The ambiguities are particularly acute when
dealing with the imitation of an artist's voice. Those opposed to preemp-
tion would argue that not only is Midler's rendition of the song being
protected, but so is the additional element of her "persona," and there-
fore her claim should not be preempted.' However, preemption sup-
porters would suggest otherwise, since the practical effect is the
protection against the imitation of Midler's vocal performance, which is
exactly what the defendants are permitted to imitate under section
398. See supra notes 326-51 for a discussion of the preemption cases.
399. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982). See also supra notes 359-60 and accompanying text.
400. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
401. The facts indicate that the defendants obtained the license from the copyright holder
to use the song. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. It logically follows that the song is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and falls within the subject matter of copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1982).
402. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1982).
403. In Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, baseball players con-
tended that they owned the broadcast rights to their performances during a baseball game.
805 F.2d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, they claimed that the rights they wanted
were not works within the meaning of section 301, and therefore were not subject to preemp-
tion. Id. at 676. The court rejected this contention, asserting that since the players' perform-
ances were recorded, they were embodied in a tangible means of expression within the subject
matter of section 102. Id. Thus, the court held, as long as the "equivalency" prong was satis-
fied, the players' state rights would be preempted. Id.
404. See supra notes 362-73 and accompanying text.
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114(b).4° 5 This tension indicates that the Copyright Act is not clear and
unequivocal as Congress intended it to be,40 6 but is rather vague and
ambiguous.
Congress could best resolve this conflict by drawing a narrow excep-
tion to section 114(b) 4°7 when applied to commercial advertising. This
exception should take the form of a "substantial-similarity" test. If a
plaintiff can show that the defendant's advertisement is "substantially
similar," in both ideas and expression, to that of the plaintiff, then the
plaintiff's state-law rights should not be preempted by section 114(b).
Using this standard, a line could be drawn designating where the copy-
right owner's freedom to imitate under section 114(b) ends and the pro-
tection of the artist begins.
The substantial-similarity test has been used previously to determine
whether a person has infringed upon another's copyright.4°8 In See v.
Durang,4 9 the Ninth Circuit employed the substantial-similarity stan-
dard to ascertain whether the defendant infringed upon the plaintiff's
copyrighted play, Fear of Acting, through the production of the defend-
ant's play, The Actor's Nightmare.4 The plaintiff argued that a compar-
ison be made, not only between the works as a whole, but also between
their component parts.41' The plaintiff urged that copying only one por-
tion of a play should constitute copyright infringement.41 2
The court rejected this argument stating that the works must be
viewed as a whole to determine whether they are substantially similar.41 3
After reviewing both screenplays in their entirety, the court affirmed the
district court's ruling "that no reasonable trier of fact could find the two
plays to be substantially similar in their form of expressing common
ideas."
4 14
The same test was applied by the Ninth Circuit in Litchfield v.
405. See supra notes 374-403 and accompanying text.
406. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5746.
407. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982). See supra note 49 for the text of section 114(b).
408. See, e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984); See v. Durang, 711
F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1983); Jason v. Fonda, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982), incorporating by refer-
ence, 526 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
409. 711 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1983).
410. Id. at 142.
411. Id. at 143.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 144.
414. Id. at 143.
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Spielberg,415 where the producers of the motion picture, E. T.-The Extra
Terrestrial were sued for copying the plaintiff's copyrighted play, Lokey
from Maldemar.416 To determine whether Spielberg copied the play, the
court applied the substantial-similarity test.417 The plaintiff had the bur-
den of proving "that the works [were] substantially similar in both ideas
and expression. ' 418 First, to determine if the ideas were similar, the court
applied an extrinsic test focusing on the alleged similarities in the objec-
tive details of the works.419 The court made it clear that any similarities
existing only at a general level would not constitute an infringement. 420
Second, to determine similarity of expression, an intrinsic test focusing
on the expected subjective response of an ordinary, reasonable person
was applied.42 The court pointed out that infringement of expression is
a difficult standard to prove because "the total concept and feel of the
works must be substantially similar. '4 22 The court compared the two
works and held that "[n]o lay observer would recognize E. T as a drama-
tization or picturization of Lokey" 423 and therefore, there had been no
infringement.424
The standard, after Litchfield, may be articulated as follows: The
plaintiff's cause of action will not be preempted if (1) a reasonable trier of
fact would find the two works substantially similar; (2) when viewing the
works as a whole; (3) objectively focusing on the idea or details of each
work; and (4) subjectively focusing on the manner in which each work
was expressed. This standard would protect the copyright holder's free-
dom to imitate under section 114(b) of the 1976 Act,42 5 because it is
difficult for the plaintiff or performer to prove all four elements. Yet, the
standard would limit the defendant's freedom if the imitation is so close
as to be indistinguishable from the plaintiff's performance. If the similar-
ities were so substantial, the performer would meet the burden of proof,
and the state causes of action would not be preempted by the 1976
415. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
416. Id. at 1355.
417. Id. at 1356.
418. Id. (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977)) (emphasis in original).
419. Id.
420. Id. at 1356-57. An example of a general similarity is a "stock scene" used in many
plays to establish a general plot. Id.
421. Id. at 1356 (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164).
422. Id. at 1357.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982).
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Act.42 6 In this way the copyright owner would maintain some freedom
and the performer's right of publicity would be protected. In Midler,
there was no copyright infringement since Ford obtained a copyright li-
cense for the song "Do You Want To Dance."427 However, the substan-
tial-similarity standard could still prove useful in determining whether
the imitation violated Midler's right not to be commercially exploited.
Had the substantial-similarity test been applied in Midler,428 the
burden of proof would most likely have been met. First, the evidence
showed that many people who heard the Ford commercial believed that
Midler was actually singing "Do You Want To Dance." '429 Therefore, a
reasonable trier of fact would most likely find the two works substan-
tially similar. Second, the evidence suggested that the entire song was
intended to sound like Midler's version.430 Third, the idea or details of
each work were clearly the same since the defendants obtained a copy-
right in "Do You Want To Dance,, 431 the very song Midler had re-
corded. The fourth prong-the subjective test-would be the most
difficult to prove, for each rendition of the song would have to be heard
by a subjective listener to determine whether a reasonable person would
think the manner of expression was identical. The Midler facts satisfy
this prong because the evidence showed that many people confused Hed-
wig for Midler.432 Presumably, all four prongs of the above test would
have been satisfied. Thus, applying this standard, Midler's state-law
causes of action would not be preempted by the 1976 Act.
In summary, in order for Congress to achieve its fundamental goal
of promoting "national uniformity in copyright protection, '433 it must
amend section 114(b) of the 1976 Act to clarify the relationship between
copyright law and common-law publicity rights as they relate to com-
mercial advertisements. It is hoped that the above proposal will provide
some guidance. Until Congress ends the confusion, the courts must
grapple with this ever-increasing problem.
426. Id. §§ 101-810.
427. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
428. See supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text for a summary of the facts of Midler.
429. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461-62.
430. Id. at 461. Ula Hedwig, the Midler sound-alike, was told to sing the song sounding as
much like Midler as possible. Id.
431. The copyright holder granted Young & Rubicam a license to use the song. Id. at 462.
432. Id. at 461-62. One person declared by affidavit that he heard the commercial several
times and thought that Midler was singing. Id. at 462.
433. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5745.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,434 the Ninth Circuit held that a
well-known artist's voice could not be commercially appropriated.435
Although the result is admirable, the reasoning is flawed. The court
should have protected Midler by interpreting California Civil Code sec-
tion 3344 to include all unauthorized uses of a voice.436 Instead, the
court based its decision on an unprecedented expansion of the malleable
common-law right of publicity doctrine.
4 37
As the case was remanded to the trial court,438 it may reach the
Ninth Circuit again. If so, the court could afford Midler state-law pro-
tection,439 but it would then have to deal with preemption under federal
law. Whether or not Midler's claim should be preempted is unclear.
Those courts which have struggled with this problem are split on the
preemption issue." ° Furthermore, federal preemption with respect to
voice brings into question section 114(b) of the Copyright Act." 1 This
issue has never been addressed by any court. Hopefully, Congress will
recognize that the Act is not "stated in the clearest and most unequivocal
language possible,"" 2 and amend it so that Midler, and those similarly
situated, will be able to protect what rightfully belongs to them.
Kimberly Lehman Turner*
434. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
435. Id. at 463.
436. See supra notes 109-216 and accompanying text for a discussion of California Civil
Code section 3344.
437. See supra notes 217-309 and accompanying text for a discussion of the common-law
theories.
438. Midler, 849 F.2d at 464. See Postscript, p. 644 for the results of the new trial.
439. This Note suggests that the court should have protected Midler under California Civil
Code section 3344 instead of under the misappropriation doctrine. See supra notes 109-216
and accompanying text for a discussion of this statute and its potential application to Midler.
440. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th
Cir. 1986); Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D. Cal.
1987); Universal City Studios v. The T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 652
F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981); Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v.
Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). See
also supra notes 362-403 and accompanying text.
441. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982).
442. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5746.
* Thanks to Professor Lionel S. Sobel for his suggestions and comments. Very special
thanks to Lawrence J. Turner for his encouragement and extraordinary patience throughout
the preparation of this Note.
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Postscript
On October 24, 1989, the parties returned to the United
States District Court for the Central District of California for a
trial on the merits. Daily Variety, Oct. 25, 1989, at 1, col 1.
Midler sought ten million dollars from Ford alleging that the car
company imitated her voice for commercial purposes. Id. How-
ever, after determining that there was insufficient evidence show-
ing Ford's actual participation in the advertisement, Judge A.
Wallace Tashima dismissed Ford from the case. L.A. Daily J.,
Oct. 27, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
The case proceeded against Ford's advertising agency,
Young & Rubicam, from whom Midler sought 25 million dol-
lars. L.A. Daily J., Oct. 31, 1989, at 1, col. 5. Judge Tashima
instructed the jurors that if they found Midler's voice was widely
known and deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, then
the defendant had misappropriated the singer's property rights in
her voice. The Hollywood Rep., Oct. 31, 1989, at 1, col. 1. After
a full day of deliberation, the jury found Young & Rubicam
liable and awarded Bette Midler damages to the tune of
$400,000. L.A. Daily J, Oct. 31, 1989, at L col. 5.
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